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CASE COMMENTS
CARRIERS-UNREASONABLE DELAY IN FURNISHING CAns

DAMAGES.-The appellee recovered damages in the sum of
$8,434.58 for the unreasoiable delay of the appellant in furnishing cars for the transportation of live poultry. The amount
sued for embraced the following item: $1,195.33 for feeding
and caring for the poultry during the period of delay; $300.00
for transportation made necessary by the delay; $5,571.87 for
depreciation in weight and fitness; and $1,367.38 for depreciation in market value. The poultry was sold f. o. b. cars at shipping point at prevailing market prices and transported tG
Louisville on the order of the purchaser and at his costs. The
jury in estimating the damages for loss in weight took the appellee's weights of poultry at the time they were bought. From
a verdict in favor of the appellee for the full amount sued for
this appeal is taken.
The question raised by this appeal is: Whether the damages assessed by the jury were excessive! The case of Newport
News & M. V. R. Go.v. Mercer, 96 Ky. 475, upholds the common
law rule that when a request has been made in due time of a
railroad company to furnish a shipper cars on a certain day,
the company is under an implied agreement to furnish cars on
that day. And in Davis v. Morgan, 251 S. W. 310 (Texas), the
court ruled that "damages, whether general or special, resulting from delay in transporting live stock to a market in time for
special sales days, may be recovered from the carrier, even
though the stock has not been sold under a definite contract before shipment was made."
An element of damage for the failure to furnish cars to a
shipper, is a charge for the feeding of the live stock rendered.
necessary by the delay in transportation by the shipper, Tobin
v. Lake jShore & M. S. By. Co., 159 N. W. 389 (Mich). And
where the carrier negligently delayed furnishing cars for live
stock, the shipper is entitled to damages, which will fairly and.
reasonably compensate him for the loss, if any, sustained by the
negligence, and in determining such loss, the jury should take
into consideration the excess shrinkage and the decline in the
market from the day the stock should have reached the market
without delay up to the time they were put on the market, and
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extra expense, if any, which the shipper sustained for the feed
occasioned by the delay. Hines v. Mason, 221 S. W. 861 (Ark.).
The case of Bahrends v. Chicago B. I & P. Ry. Co., 198 Ill. App.
236, held that unless otherwise legally limited by the contract
of carriage, the measure of damages for, delay in shipment of
live stock is the difference between the market value of the consignment at the time and in the condition it should have arrived, and its fair cash market value in the condition and the
time it actually arrived at its destination, plus the necessary
expenses caused to the shipper by the delay.
A Kentucky case, Newport News & M. V. B. Co. v. Mercer,
96 Ky. 475, is in keeping with the above cited cases which represent the weight of authority. The jury erred in giving the
full damages asked for. And in allowing $300.00 damages for
transportation of the poultry by other means, the jury clearly
erred, for under the contract with the creamery company, the
company agreed to bear the expenses of transportation. Outside
of this contract all the appellee was entitled to recover was the
difference between the sum paid, $300.00, and what it would have
cost the appellee had the poultry been carried by the appellant.
As it is, the appellee should .not have been allowed any damages
for the transportation.
The damages were excessive, the judgment should therefore
be reversed and a new trial ordered. Davis, Agent, etc. v. McKinley, 200 Ky. 699. B. F.
INF ANT Wano HAS PASsED His SEVENTEENTil BIITHDAY MAY
BE PROSECUTED WITHaOUT RECommENDATIoN.-The defendant
testified he was seventeen years of age when he married in June
1922, and the evidence shows the desertion of his wife occurred
some three or four months thereafter. Appellant's trial did
not take place until September, 1923, at which time according
to his own statement he must have been more than eighteen years
of age.
The first section of the act relating to dependent, neglected,
or delinquent children (Ky. St. 331e-1) provides: "This act
shall apply only to male children seventeen years of age or
under." The language of tie statute is susceptible of no interpretation except that it shall apply to male children who are
no more than seventeen years of age. In Mattingly v. CommonweaZth, 171 Ky. 222, it was held under this statute that the age
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of the child at the time that the offense was committed, and not
his age at the time of his trial, controls in determining the applicability of this statute and in fixing jurisdiction, so that in
either event the statute has no application in this case.
One who has passed his seventeenth birthday may be prosecuted without recommendation by the county court as required
by Ky. St. 331e-1, providing for the protection of dependent,
neglected or delinquent children seventeen years of age or under, and a contention that he is to be treated as only seventeen
years of age until he arrives at his eighteenth birthday cannot be
sustained. Thompson, v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 19. L. 0.
CARRIERS-LLIBILITY OF A CARRIER DETOURING OVER ROUTE

op

OF LEssOR AND LEssEE OF RI.uLRoAD
TRACKs.-The appellant's train, on account of a wreck, had to
detour over track of another company. The appellee, a passenger, decided to stop off at an intermediate station and spend
the night with her son, who resided there. When the train
stopped at the station for water, the appellee and her daughter
alighted therefrom and went into the waiting room of the depot,
and remained there for about thirty minutes until her son came
for them. A hallway, leading from the station to the street,
was unlighted and the appellee in passing therefrom missed the
step, twisted and sprained her knee, from which injury she
suffered considerable pain, and, as she claims, permanent injury.
From a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants appealed.
The principal question raised by this appeal is: Whether a
carrier, running its train over a detour route of another, by
reason of a wreck on its own line, is liable to a passenger for
injuries occasioned by improper lighting facilities at a station
oil the detour route, where the passenger voluntarily left the
train at a point which was not his destination, and to which
the carrier had not agreed to transport him? It is conceded, and
there are two Kentucky cases in accord, L & N. R. B. Go. v.
Johnson, 168 Ky. 351, and Ashland Goal and Iron Co. v. Elswick, 189 Ky. 507, that a lessor of a railroad track, including
its facilities, which it has acquired from the state through a
franchise, is not relieved from its liabilities and legal duties of
a carrier of passengers by leasing its tracks and facilities to
another. And a lessee of such track and facilities is not relieved
ANOTHER-LABILITY
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of its liabilities and legal duties as a carrier of passengers because it is not the owner of the track or the facilities, for it is
appropriating both the track and facilities in the exercise of its
franchise granted to it. The plaintiff relied upon these cases
for the affirmance of the judgment.
The appellant can not be considered as a lessee of the depot.
facilities, but of the track only, if at all. It was not a seeker
of passengers over the detour route and it is doubtful if it could
be compelled to take passengers from any of the stations along
the route. Likewise it was not a discharger of passengers along
the same route who were not destined for any of the stations on
it, there being none such in this case. It would be an unreasonable hardship to impose upon a detouring carrier the legal duty
of seeing that all stations along that route as well as all platforms were in 'a reasonably safe condition for the reception of
any passenger, who for his own personal convenience saw fit
to alight at those stations, altho the train was at that time completing the detoured journey. And there is nothing in the statutes that indicates that it was the intention of the legislature to
impose such duties and hardships upon a detouring carrier.
A passenger on A train, which was delayed on account of a
wreck elsewhere on the line, who voluntarily left the train and
its vicinity, ceased to be a passenger until he entered the train
or came back to the premises to board the train. Southern By.
Co. v. Stephens, 98 S. E 176, and the relationship of a carrier
to a passenger will ordinarily continue until the passenger has
reached his destination, but may be terminated at some other
point by the passenger's voluntary departure from the carrier's
vehicle. Hines v. Garrett, 108 S. E. 690. The present case is
similar to the above two cited eases.
For the above stated reasons, the judgment should be reversed with directions to sustain the motion for a new trial.
Payne, Agent. et al. v. Simmons, 201 Ky. 33. B. F.
AvomiTcE or INFANCY CONTRACTS-CONDUCT AMOuNTG
filed suit for
To MISREPRESENTATiox-ESTPPELT-Appellants
rescission of a contract made with apppellees on the ground that
appellants were infants at the time the contract was signed. Appellees denied infancy of appellants, and pleaded fraudulent
misrepresentation and concealment by appellants of their ages
to induce appellees to enter into the contract. It was not proved
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that appellants made any express representation to appellees as
to their ages, nor that appellees made any inquiry in respect
thereto. It was shown that appellants appeared to be more than
twenty-one, that they had made previous contracts in that community for a business concern, and that one of them held himself out to appellees as having been engaged in the coal business
with his father, the other representing himself as having been
in business for himself for some time. In the negotiations appellants conducted themselves as men of business experience.
Except for necessaries, a contract made by an infant is a
voidable one. In all jurisdictions it may be avoided' at the
election of the infant when he has reached the age of majority,
if the other party to the contract knew of the infancy at the
time of making the contract. As to the effect of the reliance by
the adult party to the contract upon false statements made by
the infant concerning his age at the time of entering the contract, the authorities are divided. The following is an expression of the federal and majority rule: In an action upon a contract made by an infant, he is not estopped from pleading his
infancy by any representation made by him as to his age to induce the other party to contract with him. To hold otherwise
would in many .cases deprive infants of the protection extended
to them at an age when the mind and judgment are conclusively
presumed to be immature, and they needed to be shielded from
their own imprudence and folly. It would virtually overthrow
the law upon the subject as it has existed time out of mind.
InternationalText Book Co. v. Connelly, 99 N. E. 721; Wieland
v.Kobick, 110 Ill. 16; Carpenterv. Carpenter,45 Ind. 142; Merriam v. Cunningham., 65 Mass. 40; Baker v. Stone, 136 Mass.
405; Conrad v. Lane, 26 Minn. 389; Burley v. Russell, 10 N. H.
184; Studwell v. Shapter, 54 N. Y. 249; Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51
Vt. 79; MeKamy v. Cooper, 81 Ga. 679; Norris v. Vance 3 Rich,
164; Burdett v. Williams, 30 Fed. 697; Frank Spangler Co. v.
Haupt, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 545; Healey v. Hoopengarner,64 W.
Va. 626; Miller v. St. L. & , F. R. R. Co., 188 Mo. App. 402;
Greesboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 116 S. E. 261.
Iowa, Kansas, Utah and Washington by statute provide
that a minor can not disaffirm his contract "in cases where,
on account of the minor's own misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in business as an adult, the
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other party had good reason to believe him (the minor) capable
of contracting." See Beickler v. Guenther, 121 Ia. 419; Friarv.
Rae-ChandlerCo., 185 N. W. 32; Dillon v. Burnham, 43 Kan. 77;
Kirkham v. Wheeler-Osgood, 39 Wash. 415.
A few states reach a like result without the aid of a statute.
Where a minor, who has reached a stage of maturity calculated
to deceive a person of ordinary prudence, deceives such person
as to his age and asserts he is of full age and induces a contract
to be made with him and accepts the benefits thereof, he can not
deny that he was of full age and escape the obligation of the
contract. Lake v. Perry, 49 So. 569. Kilgore v. Jordan,17 Tex.
341.; Carpenter v. Pridgen, 40 Tex. 32; Goodman v. Winter, 64
Ala. 410; Pemberton Bldg. and Loan Ass'* v. Adams, 53 N. J.
Eq. 258; Cobbey v. Buckhanan, 48 Neb. 391; Klinc v. Reeder,
185 N. W. 1000; InternationalLand Co. v. Marshalli 22 Okla.
693; Stallard v. Sutherland, 108 S. E. 568; FirstState Bank v.
Edwards, 245 S.W. 478.
Kentucky is with the minority and enforces an equitable
estoppel against infants. When an infant by reason of his personal appearance, family surroundings and business activities,
coupled with a misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment,
leads one who deals with him, in good faith and not knowing
that he is an infant, to believe that he is of age, he will be estopped from maintaining an action to avoid his executed contract. When he comes into equity seeking relief, he must have
clean hands. The privilege is a shield for the protection of the
infant and not a weapon of attack, nor is it to be used as a means
of defrauding others. County Board of Educatianv. Hensley, 147
Ky. 441, Smith v. Cole, 148 Ky. 138; Pace v. Cawood, 33 R. 592;
Schmidtheimer v. Eiseman, 7 Bush. 298.
It was contended in this case that as no statement of his
age was made by the appellant he would not be estopped from his
plea of infancy. The authorities are divided on this point. In
support of the appellant's contention see Grawman Marx and
Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556. The Kentucky rule is contra to this decision. Young v. Daniel, 201 Ky. 65: L. C.
BILLS AND NOTES-LAw OF PLAcE or TRPAxSFER CONTROLSEFFECT OF PAYMENT TO ORIGINAL PAYEE

AFTER TRANSFER-

FACTS.-A resident of Kentucky executed a promissory note for

$300.00.

The payee and his wife were domiciled in Oklahoma.
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He transferred the note to his wife at their place of domicile.
Under the Oklahoma Statute the transfer was valid. Kentucky
Statute, Section 2128, Sub-see. 2, 1915, required all transfers
between husband and wife to be recorded. The wife was divorced and sued on the note. Held: Wife was entitled to recover on the note.
As a general rule the maker of a note is chargeable with
notice of transfer; a payment after transfer does not discharge
the note, and payment to the original payee is of no effect.
Slolzman v. Wyman, 77 N. W. 285; Aturphy v. Barnard, 162
Mass. 72. This rule, however, would not apply except to a holder
in due course.
This -transfer was valid in Oklahoma, the place of the transfer. The English rule that the place of transfer controls is fast
becoming the rule in this country. The earlier rule that moveables follow the person is unsound. The validity of a transfer
depends upon the laws of the place of the transfer. Loftus v.
Farmers Natioynal Bank, 133 Pa. 97. This rule applies to transfers of both real and personal property.
The transfer of moveable property that has been duly carried out in the place where the transfer was made, will be
recognized and is good elsewhere. In Re Queensland Mercantile
Co., etc., 1 Chancery 536; and in Green v. Van Rushkirk, 5 Wall.
(U.S.) 303, it is held that the law of the place of transfer controls.
A statute rendering an unrecorded conveyance between
husband and wife void, does not apply outside the state where
the statute is in force, and does not affect transfers made outside
the state. Wills v. Memphis Groc. Co., 19 Southern 101. This
case makes the Kentucky rule conform to the general rule. It
holds that the'law of the place of transfer controls where there
is a conflict in the statutory laws of two states, in regard to disabilities of coverture. Fogarty v. Neal, 201 Ky. 85.
E. R. J.
TAXES-RIEDEMPTION op LAND SOLD FOR TAxEs.-Plaintiff
filed a bill in equity to quiet title. Defendant purchased the land
at sale for taxes. Plaintiff, paid the amount of taxes and received
a deed from the sheriff. The plaintiff had no authority from the
original owners to redeem the land. Held: Defendant was entitled to counterclaim.
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The sale of land for taxes is regulated by statute, and varies
in the different states as to the time allowed for redemption.
The purchaser of a tax certificate does not acquire title, as a
general rule, until the issue of a, tax deed after the time of redemption has expired. Wells v. Glos, 115 N. E. 658. Some
states hold that the purchaser of land at a tax sale gets title
subject only to the owner's right of redemption. Beckhamz v.
Lindsey, 95 S. E. (Ga.) 745. This method has practically the
same effect as the general rule.
The owner of land sold for taxes may redeem the land by
payment to the county clerk or treasurer of the sum due. Forehtand v. Higbe, 202 S. W. 29. Certain parties and interests are
also allowed to redeem land sold for taxes, to safeguard their
interests. Isbell v. Grayl.ock Mills, 120 N. E. 446.
The owner of land sold for taxes is allowed two years in
which to redeem his property in Kentucky. He may sell his
right to redeem or he may by writing empower a third party to
redeem the land. It is the general rule, as well as the rule in
Kentucky, that a third party can not redeem land sold for taxes.
Wilson v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 140 Ky. 642. Bradford v.
Walker, 9 R. 586; Gen. Stat. article 8, chapter 92, section 14.
This case reaffirms the rule as laid down in Wilson against Germania Fire Ins. Co., 140 Ky. 642. The latter case, however, is
not exactly in point and the rule was more in the form of dicta,
than a direct decision. Turner v. Shepherd, 201 Ky. 116.
E. R. J.
PARENT AND CHILD-WELFARE OF CHILD THE QUESTION IN
DETERMINING CUSTODY-A1OTHR NOT B-ARED FRom CUSTODY OF
CHILD BY ADULTEROUS ACTS WmRE SHE HAS REFORMED-GIRL
OF TENDER YEARS PUT IN THE CUSTODY OF MOTHER.-A. father

secured a divorce on the ground of adultery. After the divorce
the child was taken to the home of her paternal grandparents,
where she has since remained. The father remarried, but is now
serving a penitentiary sentence for murder. After a complete
reformation the mother married a man of property and splendid
reputation who, with his wife, the mother, appealed from a dismissal of their petition for the care, custody, possession and
control of the infant. The grandparents, both highly moral and
well intending, live in a small, two room cabin with six other
children besides said infant. The child is there poorly pro-
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vided with food and clothing, however solicitous their wishes
for her welfare. Since her reformation a few years ago, the
mother ha3 led an exemplary life and her husband's home has
all the advantages to be found in that section. Several witnesses testified that the welfare of the child would be enhanced
by her removal there.
The right of the father to the custody of his infant children was the starting point of the law of parent and child. In
Kentucky and some other states by statute the father and mother
are declared to be joint guardians of their children, with equal
rights of custody and control, this right to vest in the survivor when either dies. The right to the custody and control of
the infant children is, however, not absolute, to be regarded as
a property right, but is rather in the nature of a trust imposed
for the child's benefit. The statute recognizes the natural right
of the surviving parent to the sole custody of an infant child,
but having always in view the interest of the child, requires of
such parent that he or she shall be suited to the sacred trust and
reserves the right where the parent is not so suited to change the
custody, even to the extent of committing it to a stranger, and
in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary fixes the
right of the parent to such custody. Walker v. Crocket, 194

Ky. 531.
As to the right of a parent against other persons, Stapleton
v. Poynter is a leading case. While the welfare of a child is to
be considered in determining who is to have its custody, the legal
right of a parent should also have weight. Therefore the widowed mother of a boy nine years old is entitled to his possession
as against his paternal grandparents with whom he has lived
for several years, though they have fortune, character, kindliness and affection for the child, and though he prefers to remain
with them; the mother being a person of moral habits without
contagious or infectious disease and of enough industry to reasonably insure the child from want. Stapleton v. Poynter, Ill
Ky. 264. An even stronger case is the present one, where the
mother can offer superior advantages. Under the Statute, a
grandparent is not entitled to the custody of a child as against
a parent unless a strong case is made against the parent. Orr v.
State, 123 N. E. 470. Parental affection in most instances will
afford to the child the tenderest care and highest protection, and
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a parent is entitled to the custody unless some good cause is
shown and the parent's superior right should not be disturbed
unless manifestly to the child's best interest. Morris v- Morris,
96 So. 374. Courts will not take from parents the custody of
their children upon a charge of unfitness to maintain and care
for them unless the charge is sustained by clear and satisfactory
proof. Jendefl v. Dupree, 195 Pac. 861.
In a suit between mother and grandparents to obtain custody of a child, the case must be determined solely with a view
to the general good and welfare of the child. The mother of the
child, divorced and remarried, should not be denied custody of
the child as against its paternal grandparents because of adultery committed during the first marriage, where her conduct
shows complete reformation. As between grandparents and
mother the custody of a child of tender years should be given
to the mother. Vanwver, et al. v. Johnson, et at., 201 Ky. 302.
L .C.
CRtimniNA LAw-"STUD" Po~mR.-Defendant was twice
tried and convicted under two separate indictments accusing
him of gambling, more specifically playing "stud" poker. His
plea on the second trial was former conviction. The facts show
that in the game of hazard which the defendant and others participated in the car& were separately dealt and defendant
played for some seventy-five so-called "pots;" that at the end of
each deal of cards the winner would take the "pot" and after
that another deal would be made with the same result.
The court held that each hand of cards dealt constituted
a separate offense, though at the same sitting, and a conviction
for engaging in one hand does not bar a subsequent conviction
for engaging in another hand.
The defendant seemed to think in this case that if he should
be indicted and convicted for betting money at a game 6f cards,
at any time within twelve months, that this conviction would be
a full license for him to bet money at a game of cards every
day within the twelve months; which on the face of it is a gross
absurdity.
In 27 Corpus Juris 979 it is said in substance that to bet is
to put to hazard a sum ascertained upon a future happening of
some event then uncertain; to stake or pledge money or property
upon an event of a contingent nature. In this case there were
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several chances taken each time a deal was made and a "pot"
was put up. The determination of another one upon which an
independent and separate stake is made would constitute and
be a separate game of hazard and the persons participating in
the game would be guilty of another offense.
On reasoning the holding in this case seems clearly right and
is in accord with the weight of authority. See Torney v. State
(Texas) 11 S. W. 36; Parks v. State, 57 Texas 569; Wren v.
State, 200 S. W. 844; Wingard v. State, 13 Ga. 396; Ramsey v.
State, 5 Tenn. 632; Jokitso. v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314.
A. H.
CRI]NxAL LAW-ABUSE AND BLASPHEmY, DIRECTED TowARm
ONE UNDER INVESTIGATION, BY OFFICERS, NOT COUNTENANCED.-

Defendant was indicted for knowingly receiving stolen property,
tried and convicted. The material facts are, that one C made a
confession of stealing the goods and selling them to the defendant. Police officers visited the defendant demanding the goods.
The officers then said to him, "You come with us and face C
at the jail and hear what he says." Defendant went with them
very willingly although he states he was cursed and abused by
them, and upon meeting C where he was confined, admitted having received the goods but stating that he did not know that
they were stolen goods. New trial was asked because of Ky.
Stat. 1649b-1. which says that, "Sweating is defined to be the
questioning of a person in custody charged with a crime in an
attempt to obtain information from him concerning his connection with the crime or knowledge thereof, after he has been arrested and in custody as stated, by plying him with questions
or by threats or other wrongful means, extorting from him information to be used as testimony against him upon trial for
such alleged crime."
The court held that the defendant was not under arrest
at the time referred to and that he could not have the benefits of
the provisions of the "sweating act." A Kentucky case in point
with this is Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 153 Ky. 412.
Defendant was not under arrest at the time nor was he
charged with the crime; it further appears from the facts that
the statements made by him were voluntary and of his own free
will.
The court did go so far as to say that neither law nor de-
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cency will countenance blasphemy or abuse directed against one
under investigation by officers of the law, or others whose duty
is to enforce it by proper and respectable methods. Frankln
v. Connzanwealt&, 201 Ky. 324.
SALES-SALE

GIvEN IN A

BY

SAMPLE--NocE OF DEFECTS MUST BE
TiE---AN OFFER TO RETURN DEFECTIVE

REASONABLE

GOODS, AND HOLDING SUBJECT TO THE SELLER'S ORDER, ARE A

SUFFICIENT REJEcTiN.-Plaintiff, now the appellee, sued to recover on a merchandise account. The defendant purchased shoes
of the plaintiff by sample. When the shoes arrived he examined
them, and decided that they were not as warranted in material
and workmanship, and returned the invoice saying he would
return the goods as they were unsatisfactory. The notation on
the invoice was, "No use to return this invoice; goods will be returned," and the signature of the appellant.
Judgment was for the plaintiff in the lower court owing
to the following erroneous instruction: "That if from a prompt
examination the defendant ascertained the shoes to be inferior to
the sample, and for that reason undertook to reject them, it became his duty to return them within a reasonable time, and if
he failed to do this or kept or accepted them, he was bound for
the price thereof."
The correct exposition of the law is, that if under such circumstances the shoes were found to be inferior to the sample the
buyer should immediately notify the seller of his rejection, and
either return the goods or offer to do so. If he did this, and then
retained the goods subject to seller's order, as in this case, such
retention would not be an acceptance of the merchandise, or a
waiver of his right of rejection.
The returning of the invoice was sufficient notice to the
seller of the rescinding of the contract. In 150 Ky. 169 it was
held that an offer to return goods in a reasonable time after the
discovery of defects was sufficient to constitute a rescission. In
111 N. Y. Sup. 561 the rule is laid down that when the defendant in an action for the price of aA article sets up a breach of
warranty, he must show a rescission of the contract by a return
or an offer to return the article sold and all benefits received
under the contract. 145 Ia. 441, 147 Ia. 353, 45 Wash. 143, 159
Ky. 842.
The case at bar clearly falls within this rule as the defend-
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ant gave notice of the defect, offered to return the goods, and
at all times held them subject to order of the seller. Taylor v.
Eblinger Shoe Mfg. Co., 201 Ky. 419.
J. W. C.
INSURANCE-ORAL CONTRACT VAM-n-AN ORAL CONTRACT
OF INSURANCE WHICH CONTAINS .ALII THE ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL

TO A CONTRACT IS VALID.-A special agent of an insurance company who had power to make an oral contract of insurance orally
agreed to issue a policy on the appellee's barns; a tobacco barn
and feed barn which were only a short distance apart were the
buildings insured. The agreement was that the policy was to be
suspended on the tobacco barn while the tobacco was being fired,
but that it should be good at all times on the feed barn. The
policy was issued, and sent to the appellee, and he relying on the
agreement made with the agent put it away in a trunk without
examining it. He never examined it until after the feed barn
burned. It was then found that a suspension clause was inserted which applied to the feed barn as well as the tobacco
barn while the tobacco was -being fired.
In this state an oral contract of insurance which contains
all the elements essential to a contract is valid, and it is within
the apparent scope of the authority of a special agent to make
an oral contract of insurance, unless the insured knows of some
limitation on the agent's power, which was not true in this
case.
In Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Snowden.
173 Ky. 664, there was an oral agreement for insurance. When
the policy was read it was learned that one clause stated that
"this policy shall be void if there is any other insurance on the
property." The insured had a policy with another company,
but had acted in good faith with the defendant company. It
was held that the clause mentioned should be stricken out, and
the contract of insurance should be in compliance with the oral
agreement. 163 Ky. 169 and 187 Ky. 311 are in accord.
An insurance policy may be reformed the same as other
written instruments if by means of mutual mistake or mistake on
one side and fraud on the other it has been so drawn up that it
does not conform to the original agreement. Cecil v. Kentucky
Livestolc Insurance Co., 165 Ky. 211, 183 U. S. 25.
In this case therefore judgment was rendered for the insured, the plaintiff below, for the amount of the policy. Home
Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Evans, 201 Ky. 487.
J. W. C.

